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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION/NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).
The appellants (Atkinsons) filed a lawsuit July 26,
1987 against IHC Hospitals, Inc. (IHC), Scott Wetzel Services,
Inc. (Wetzel) and Scott Olsen, claiming fraud or negligent
misrepresentation as to a settlement agreement reached in
connection with injuries sustained by Chad Atkinson while he was
a patient at Primary Children's Medical Center.

The heart of

the complaint is that the settlement agreement is not worth
three million dollars as was allegedly negotiated, and that the
settlement agreement was only entered into by the Atkinsons
because the "defendants" said that Chad Atkinson, the brain
damaged child, was going to be normal.
The Atkinsons also sued Steven G. Morgan and the law
firm of Morgan, Scalley & Reading for legal malpractice.
The district court granted summary judgment as to all
defendants.

The court also denied the Atkinsons1 motion to file

an amended complaint.
This is an appeal from the district court's granting
of summary judgment as to all defendants and denying the
Atkinsons1 motion to amend the complaint.

- 1-

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

The issues presented for review as to IHC are as
follows:
1.

Whether the lower court properly granted summary

judgment to IHC by dismissing the Atkinsons1 complaint?
2.

Whether the plaintiffs1 signed release of all

claims bars the present claims against IHC for fraud and
negligent misrepresentation?
3.

Whether the medical malpractice statute of

limitations or the fraud statute of limitations bars the claims
against IHC?
4.

Whether the probate court-approved settlement

collaterally estops the plaintiffs1 claims for fraud and
negligent misrepresentation?
5.

Whether the plaintiffs' request for a declaratory

judgment was properly denied where there was no justiciable
controversy?
6.

Whether the district court abused its discretion

in denying the motion to amend the complaint?

- 2 -

TEXT OF AUTHORITIES

Statute of limitations for fraud or mistake;
Within three years:
(3) an action for relief on the ground of
fraud or mistake; except that the cause of
action in such case does not accrue until the
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts
constituting fraud or mistake.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3).

Utah Health Care Malpractice Act provisions^
Definition of terms as used in this Act:
(29) "Malpractice action against a health
care provider" means any action against a
health

care

provider,

whether in contract,

tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death or
otherwise, based upon alleged personal
injuries relating to or arising out of health
care rendered or which should have been
rendered by the health care provider.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(29).

Statute of Limitations—Excepti qns - -^Application.
(1) No malpractice action against a health
care provider may be brought unless it is
commenced within two years after the plaintiff
or patient discovers, or through the use of
reasonable diligence should have discovered
the injury, which ever first occurs, but not
to exceed four years after the date of the
alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence,
except that:
(b) In an action where it is
alleged that a patient has been
- 3 -

prevented from discovering
misconduct on the part of a
health care provider because the
health care provider has
affirmatively acted to
fraudulently conceal the alleged
misconduct, the claim shall be
barred unless commenced within
one year after the plaintiff or
patient discovers, or through the
use of reasonable diligence,
should have discovered the
fraudulent concealment, whichever
first occurs.
(2) The provisions of this section shall
apply to all persons, regardless of minority
or other legal disability under § 78-12-36 or
any other provision of the law.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1), (2).

_ 4 -

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Atkinsons 1 minor son, Chad Atkinson,

suffered

brain damage after he aspirated while a patient a+~ Primary
Children's Medical Center on ^arrn 4. ) 9 H

.

*

. :..5

entered into a settlement agreement which they now claim is
inadequate.
The Atkinsons specifically claim that IHC, its
adjuster Wetzel, and Wetzel/s employee, Scott Olsen, are guilty
o£ f raud and neg J i y e 11 t mi s i;epresen ta 11 <in i fi connection with
obtaining the settlement with the Atkinsons.
IHC, through its agent, Wetzel, retained Steven G.
Morgan for the purpose of presenting the settlement agr eement to
the Third Judicial District Court.

The Atkinsons now claim that

Morgan was their attorney and that he committed legal
malpractice.
The Atkinsons also sought declaratory relief, asking
the court to constr u* a i >< >r tion of the settlement agreement and
determine whether it inr Ludes institutional care and custodial
living costs for Chad Atkinson.
IHC fll e< I
served.

By agreement

:

' >i i to dismiss after the complaint was

•" counsel, the motion was not noticed up

for hearing unti1 after discovery pertinent to f'he issues had
been completed

IHC then moved for summary judgment.
-.: - 5 -

The

motion for summary judgment was granted.

(R. at 590-593.)

Morgan and the law firm also filed a motion for summary
judgment, as did Wetzel and Olsen.

Their motions were granted.

(Rc at 430-432, 590-593.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In addition to the facts set forth in the Brief of
Respondents (Morgan), the Court should be aware of the following:
1.

The plaintiffs Roger and Polly Atkinson sought

appointment as conservators and guardians of Chad Atkinson to
enable them to settle Chad Atkinson's claims against Primary
Children's Medical Center.
1983.

Appointment was granted July 26,

(R. at 644, Exhibit 8.)
2.

The Court-approved appointment of Roger and Polly

Atkinson and approval of the settlement agreement followed at
least five separate meetings directly involving Roger and Polly
Atkinson, Roger's father, a Primary Children's Medical Center
administrator, and Scott Olsen.

(R. at 653, pp. 31-50.)

The

end result of the negotiations was a complete financial package
covering Chad Atkinson's medical care, education and investment
protection, with additional money going to Roger and Polly
Atkinson for their inconvenience.
3.

(R„ at 644, Exhibit 7.)

Roger and Polly Atkinson, with parental support,

actively participated in negotiating a settlement.

By May 27,

1983, Primary Children's Medical Center had admitted it felt
responsible for Chad's condition.
- 6 -

(See complaint at 1F 16; R. at

2-19.)

Scott Olsen, on behalf of Primary Children's Medical

Center, made the Atkinsons an offer
Roger and Poll y Atkinson discussed
parents.

P

at 651, Exhibit

,,

che proposal with tl: le . r

(Deposition of Joyce Carol Sorensen, R

at 848, pp.

14-22; deposition of Eldon Sorensen, R. at 649, pp. 9-11;
deposition of Shirley Atkinson, h
deposition of George Atkinson

9

at £4fc
at 6 M

father then assisted Roger

*.- . t,. ; , ,

ten-page counter-proposal.

(R. at 65i

68, 70-73.)

pp

15-17; and

pp. 6-48,)
f

Roger's

^ *-w,q i ^gether a :

pi.. 6-48; R

644 at pp.

After several meetings, an agreement was reached.

(R, at 64 4, Kxhibit

'i )

( HI 1 so fount' -

-^'iendum 0" to 'Morgan's

Brief of R e s p o n d e n t ) .
4.

The agreement, which ^ a * eventual! y approved by

the district court, provided that IHC, Primary Children's
Medical Center, and their agents were to be released from claims
arising o\ it of the March 4, ] 983 incident wherej n Chad 1 lad
undergone oxygen deprivation,
5.

(Id,)

Because the extent of Chad A t k i n s o n 1 s damages were

uric e rt a i n, t:he a g r e e m e n t wa s b a s ed, o n 1 y o n Ro ge i: ancii P o 1 1 y
A t k i n s o n ' s a s s e s s m e n t of C h a d ' s c o n d i t i o n
6.

(1d)

Roger and Pol ly Atkinson were invited to have Chad

evaluated by medical specialists in At izona, at IHC's expense to
determine the exact nature of Chad's injuries.
the offer.

(R. at 6 5 1 , p . 5 0 ; R. at 653,

- 7 -

They declined
68-69.)

7.

Roger and Polly were aware before the settlement

was approved by the court that Chad Atkinson had suffered brain
damage.

(See Transcript of July 22, 1983, court proceeding,

attached to Affidavit of Philip R. Fishier, R. at 184-197, also
attached as "Addendum A" to Morgan's Brief of Respondent,
hereinafter "Transcript".)
8.

Roger and Polly Atkinson were apprised by the

district court at the time the settlement agreement was
approved, that entering into the settlement agreement would
prohibit them from suing IHC or any of its agents if Chad's
condition later took a turn for the worse.

(Transcript at pp.

1-2.)
9.

Roger and Polly were aware on July 22, 1983 that

the guaranteed payout of the settlement agreement was about
$900,000.00 plus medical expenses, rather than three million
dollars.

(Transcript at pp. 2-4).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

IHC did not not misrepresent Chad Atkinson's physical
condition or the value of the settlement agreement.

Plaintiffs

complain that the "defendant's" induced the Atkinsons to settle
their claims by concealing from them the physical condition of
their son and the permanent nature of his injury, and by
misrepresenting that the value of the settlement agreement was
_ Q

_

worth in excess of $3,000,000

No evidence in the record

supports the claim that IHC either misrepresented Chad
Atkinson1 s conn ; r i o n o r misr epresented the va ] ue of the
settlement agreement.
Plaintiffs1 action is barred by their settlement
agreement.

The plain language of the release in the settlement

agreement should bar the plaintiffs1 claim against IHC, Wetzel
and Olsen

The release discharges IHC and Primary Children* s

Medical Center and their agents from all claims.

The release

specifically recognizes the extent of Chad's injuries is
uncertain

f-sRcnuse plaint J f f s now believe Chad has actual 1 ";r

suffered brain damage to a greater extent than earlier believed
is no reason to

r e open

the settlement agreement.

The release

should prohibit the present action.
The Atkinsons have alleged fraud invalidates the
settlement

^qrppm^nt

and tel ease.

Even so, they have continued

to demand and accept the monthly payments under the settlement
agreement and the required payments of Chad's medical expenses.
The victim of al 1 eged frat id c: a n n o t botl i aff i rm a n d d i s a f f i r m a
settlement agreement that contains - release

To claim the

benefits a part of the settlement agreement, which includes
r e c e I p t o f moi 111 iJ y p a y m e n t s :i n m e d I c a 1 e x p e n s e s , wh:i 1 e n o t
abiding by the agreement not to sue; which is the plaintiffs1
obligation under the agreement, defeats the essential purpose o
the compromise and settlement

None of the cases cited by the

plaintiffs stand for the principle that fraud can set aside a
written release where the release has been approved by a prior
court and where substantial consideration has been and will be
paid.
Plaintiffs' action is barred by applicable statutes of
limitation.

Chad Atkinson's injury occurred on March 4, 1983.

Throughout the summer of 1983, the Atkinsons were informed by
doctors, an administrator at Primary Children's Medical Center,
and Scott Olsen that Chad was brain damaged, that the hospital
felt responsible for Chad's injuries, and that the Atkinsons had
a claim against the hospital.

This was confirmed by the

district judge before he approved the settlement agreement on
July 22, 1983.

At that time, the Atkinsons were also informed

by the court that the value of the settlement agreement was
approximately $900,000, rather than the $3,000,000 that they now
allege was represented to them.

The Atkinsons informed the

district court at that time that Chad also had suffered brain
damage.

Such facts should be sufficient to start the statutes

of limitations running for either medical malpractice, fraud or
mistake.
The Probate Court-approved settlement collaterally
estops plaintiffs' action.

The plaintiffs, as well as IHC, were

before the Third Judicial District Court in July, 1983 to
determine whether the financial payouts in the settlment
agreement were sufficient to cover Chad's brain damaged
- 10 -

condition

By filing the complaint in this action, the same

parties were before the same court trying to make the same
determination.

Plaintiffs* are once again seeking payment to

cover Chad's condition.

Because the parties and issues are

re 1 a.ted, the pi inc:i p] e o£ co 1 1 atera 1 estoppe I shoi 11 <:! app 1 y to
bar of this action.
P l a i n t i f f s 1 declaratory action lacked a justiciable
controversy.

Tl ie At:ki nsotis sought to construe 11 ie se11:] einent

agreement to require IHC to p^y for additional institutional
custodial living costs

To aate. defendant IHC has paid Chad

Atkinson's medical co^ r - pursuan 1
requested,

and

\o the settlemei it agreement as

There is no allegation,, or facts in the record, that

plaintiffs have ever requested IHC to pay for any of the items
referred to, or that IHC has refused to pay them.

Since no

breach or anticipated breach was p:ed or shown in the record,
p 1 a i n t i £ £ s £ a :i ] e d t o s h o w a j u s t i c i a b 1 e c o n t r o v e i s y r i p e f c i : a
declaratory judgment.
The m o t i o n to amend the complaint was properly
denied.

Plaintiffs 1 motion to .<•••

>.*: •

^n . - : - *

.

ide

a claim for medical malpractice against IHC was properly denied
by the district court.

The claim was untimely under either the

one or two-year statute of 1imitation, or the four-year

statute

of repose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice A c t , since the
Atkinsons f noti ce of i ntei it to commence an action was filed
approximately four and one-half years after they discovered they
- 11 -

had a cause of action, and nearly five years after the injury
occurred.

Defendant-respondent IHC Hospitals, Inc. is requesting
that the district court's grant of its motion for summary
judgment be affirmed.

ARGUMENT
IHC believes this action should never have been
brought and is a waste of judicial and defendants1 resources.
The parties settled the underlying claims in July 1983 after a
summer of negotiating the various terms of the settlement.
Given the nature of Chad Atkinson's injuries, the
treating physicians could not predict Chad's future condition.
Defendants even offered to pay for a specialist to examine Chad
Atkinson before the settlement agreement was entered into so
that an independent evaluation could be made of Chad's
condition.

The Atkinsons declined the offer.

Now the

plaintiffs allege that Chad Atkinson's condition is worse than
what they had been told by "the defendants."
There is no evidence in the record that any
representation made by IHC was negligently made or was knowingly
false.

There is also no evidence in the record that the

settlement, which guarantees at least $740,000.00 to the
plaintiffs, and more than $1,280,000.00 if Chad lives to age 65,

is unfair or is an inadequate amount given the nature of Chad's
injuries.
IHC

•

-

v

-

•). t • its: o?::> Ligations under the

settlement agreement for over six years and has paid its
required payments and regular monthly payments, as well as all
submitted medical expenses.

IHC believes the settlement was

fair and that the plaintiffs 1 present action seeking more money
is barred "by the release contained

• the settlement

aoreminent,

as well as applicable statutes of limitation and the principles
of collateral estoppel.

I•

IHC DID NOT MISREPRESENT CHAD ATKINSON'S PHYSICAL
CONDITION OR THE VALUE OF THE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT.

Plaintiffs complain that the "defendants" induced the
Atkinsons to settle their claims ;

oi:rf».-, ; i r ^ t. .- • aeixt t .he

physical condition of their son an:, the permanent nature of his
injury, and by misrepresenting that the valu*--* :f ' h** settlement
agreement was % *fr;

f

pxre-s

(Complaint, R. -^ - ' ' '-* 5151

a

tnree .. . \ \ -jr, J1° *

When asked

tars.
*- discovery to

specify what was concealed by IHC, plaintiffs are silent.

The

reco rd, howeve i , i e f ] ect s tl 1at the doc to rs wo rking at Primary
Children's Medical Center provided the Atkinsons with what
information was available, and the Atkinsons so admitted.

- 13 -

In addition, no evidence in the record supports the
claim that IHC represented the value of the settlement agreement
at three million dollars.

The value of the agreement can be

seen on its face as paying out between approximately $740,000.00
and $1,280,000.00, depending on the circumstances, plus medical
expenses.

The district court confirmed the Atkinsons1

understanding of this before the settlement agreement was
court-approved.
Plaintiffs fail to show the necessary elements of
either fraud or negligent misrepresentation.

There is no

evidence in the record that IHC made a false representation
concerning a fact which IHC (or its doctors, for that matter)
knew to be false or was made recklessly or negligently without
sufficient knowledge, or that they omitted material facts when
there was a duty of disclosure for the purpose of inducing the
Atkinsons to act.

Taylor v. Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 293 (Utah

1980); Christensen v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d
302 (Utah 1983).

A.

Drs. Matlak and Thompson could not predict Chad

Atkinson's future condition.
The Atkinsons complain the doctors would not tell them
what Chad's future condition would be, and that this omission
constitutes fraud or negligent misrepresentation.

Plaintiffs

have not shown that the doctors should have been able to
- 14 -

foretell Chad's future condition.

A review of the record shows

that neither Dr. Matlak nor Dr. Thompson could predict Chad's
future condition given the nature of his injuries.

See, e.g.,

R. at 645, pp. 10-11 (Dr. Matlak discussed the effects of the
brain damage with Roger and Polly, such as feeding problems,
motor difficulties, spasticity and seizures); R. 645, pp. 11-12
(Dr. Matlak told Roger and Polly the brain damage could be
permanent, but it could not be predicted).
Observation and the passage of time would be needed to
determine what Chad's future condition would be.
at 645, p.15, 16, line 17-24

See, e.g., R.

(time is needed to determine the

extent of a child's injury or the extent of the ultimate
handicaps a child will have); Dr. Thompson testified that given
the nature of Chad's injury, there was no way to predict what
Chad's outcome would be.
months or possibly years.

Chad would have to be observed for
See R. at 650, pp. 39-40, 43-45, 46.

The Atkinsons' testimony is consistent with that of
Dr. Matlak and Dr. Thompson.

See R. at 647, pp. 23-24, 25 (Dr.

Matlak did "explain the worst" and told the Atkinsons that they
would have to wait to see what Chad's condition would be); R. at
647, pp. 25-26.

("He would tell us that only time would tell

what would happen.")
Finally, there was no reliance on Dr. Matlak's opinion
for purposes of a settlement.

The Atkinsons did not seek advice

from Dr. Matlak as to a prognosis for purposes of settlement.

See R. at 645, pp. 37, lines 6-18.

Even after settlement, the

Atkinsons received no different information from the doctors
than they had before.

B.

R. at 647, pp. 114-115.

The Atkinsons knew Chad's injuries could be

permanent and they anticipated future problems.
There is substantial evidence in the record that the
Atkinsons were aware not only that Chad had brain damage, but
that they discussed it and anticipated that they may have future
problems.

See R. at 644, p.29 (someone, "maybe Dr. Matlak,"

informed Roger that Chad would "not be normal"); when the
Atkinsons took Chad home from the hospital he was not normal.
RD at 644, p.33 (Chad still had to be fed through a nasogastric
tube).
It is clear that Roger and Polly contemplated Chad's
institutionalization.

See R. at 644, pp. 63-64:

MR. FELT:

My question was, "At what
point in time did you decide
that the amount they offered
you in writing here on
Exhibit 1 was not agreeable
to you?

ROGER ATKINSON:

We sat down and talked
maybe after the second
meeting after we went
through, me and Polly and so
forth, and thought maybe they
did mess him up and there was
things like
institutionalization if he
didn't grow up right because
they said there was an
-
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accident and if they did,
these are things we had to
plan fore
MR. FELT:

Did they discuss the problem
of institutionalization with
you at that time?

ROGER ATKINSON:

I think at one time we did,
further on down the road,
though.

Roger had even discussed the concept of institutionalization
with his father:

Id.

MR. FELT:

Where did you first get the
idea of the possibility that
Chad would have to be
institutionalized?

ROGER ATKINSON:

Me and my father thinking
together, just in case it ever
did happen, because you never
know.

at 80.

See also R. at 644, p. 68 ("I felt like if there was

going to be a problem later on in life there should be something
for the people who was going to take care of him.")

R. at 644,

p. 150 (Roger read the release and knew the injuries could be
permanent; he was so informed.)

R. at 647, p. 81, lines 3-6

(before accepting the settlement offer, Roger and Polly
discussed Chad's brain damage.)

R. at 647, p. 124, line 6-8

(Polly Atkinson was told brain damage was a serious injury); R.
at 647, p. 34 (Polly Atkinson knew that Chad was being kept on
phenobarbital to prevent seizures).
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C.

While the settlement negotiations were ongoing,

Chad was in the Atkinsons1 care and custody; the doctors relied
on the Atkinsons' representations of Chad's condition for their
evaluations.
The Atkinsons were very much aware of Chad's condition
during the summer of 1983 while settlement negotiations were
ongoing.

Early in the summer, before the Atkinsons were even

approached about settlement, Chad was released from the hospital
to the care of his parents.

During the follow-up visits that

occurred, the doctors had to rely on the Atkinsons'
representations about Chad's condition in order to make a
complete evaluation.

See, R. at 645, pp. 18-19 (Polly Atkinson

provided Dr. Matlak information on Chad's development to assist
with the doctor's assessment); R. at 645, pp. 22-23 (after Chad
left the hospital, Marty Palmer, an independent physician, was
the pediatrician providing primary care for Chad); R. at 645, p.
24 (Dr. Matlak's statement to Dr. Palmer that Chad was
performing at "an age appropriate fashion" was based in part on
information obtained from Polly Atkinson); R. at 645, p.39
(Polly Atkinson told Dr. Thompson during an examination that
Chad was "doing really good").
D.

Before the settlement agreement was finalized, the

Atkinsons refused an independent medical evaluation.
During the summer of 1983, a series of about five
meetings were held while the parties worked out the terms of the

settlement.

Because the doctors could not give an absolute

diagnosis and prognosis of Chad's condition, Scott Olsen offered
to have additional medical tests run by an independent physician
in Arizona at no cost to the Atkinsons.

R. at 653, pp. 68-69;

R. at 651, p. 50. That offer occurred probably after the second
meeting with the Atkinsons.
tests.

Roger and Polly decided against the

Id.
E.

IHC did not misrepresent the value of the

settlement.
There is no evidence in the record to support the
plaintiffs' claim that IHC represented the value of the
settlement agreement at three million dollars.

The source for

that figure was the Atkinsons' ten-page counter-proposal,
drafted by Roger and his father, which was rejected by Scott
Olsen and IHC.

The record shows that the Atkinsons knew the

approximate payout of the settlement agreement would be
$900,000,00, plus medical expenses, which was confirmed by the
district court before the settlement agreement was signed.

(See

R. at 647, pp. 59, 62-63; Transcript at p. 4).
Plaintiffs argue the present value of the structured
settlement is only about $109,000.00.
settlement is irrelevant.

The present value of the

During the negotiations no one made

any representation as to what the present value of the
settlement was.

Second, the fact that a settlement in a medical

malpractice case is structured does not make it inappropriate or
- 19 -

unfair.

The Legislature requires such where damages exceed

$100,000.00.

See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-9.5(2):

(2) In any malpractice action against a
health care provider, as defined in Subsection
78-14-3(29), the court shall, at the request
of any party, order that future damages which
equal or exceed $100,000.00, less amounts
payable for attorney's fees and other costs
which are due at the time of judgment, shall
be paid by periodic payments rather than by a
lump sum payment.
Finally, there is no evidence in the record that
Chad's damages should have been compensated at a figure higher
than the amount set forth in the settlement agreement.

II.

PLAINTIFFS' ACTION IS BARRED BY THEIR
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.

A.

Plaintiffs' claim against IHC is barred by the

plain language of the release.
The Atkinsons have been quick to say the release
contained in the settlement agreement entered into by the
parties in July 1983 is not binding on them so as to prohibit
their action against IHC.
should work both ways.

Mutual obligations in an agreement

They have kept the benefits of the

settlement agreement, but have ignored their obligations under
the agreement.
As the discovered facts show, plaintiffs negotiated an
agreement with IHC, which was approved by the Third Judicial
District Court.

The agreement, signed by the plaintiffs as

guardians and conservators of Chad Atkinson, prohibits this
action:
Hereby on their own behalf and on behalf of
their minor child, Chad Atkinson, and their
heirs, executors, administrators, successors
and assigns, release, acquit and forever
discharge Intermountain Health Care Hospitals,
Inc., and Primary Children's Medical Center or
their agents, servants, successors, heirs,
executors, administrators, of and from any and
all claims, actions, causes of action,
demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of
service, expenses and compensation whatsoever,
which [Roger and Polly Atkinson] or their
minor child, Chad Atkinson, now have or which
may hereafter acc[ru]e on account of or in any
way growing out of any and all known and
unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and
personal injuries and property damage and the
consequences thereof resulting or to result
from the accident, casualty or event which
occurred on or about the 4th day of March,
1983, at the Primary Children's Medical
Center.

It is understood and agreed that this
settlement is a compromise of a doubtful and
disputed claim, and that the payment made is
not to be construed as an admission of
liability on the part of the party or parties
hereby released and that said releasees deny
liability therefor and merely intend to avoid
litigation and buy their peace.
Settlement Agreement, R. at 15-16 (emphasis added).

IHC

believes this release bars plaintiffs' claims against itself as
well as Wetzel and Olsen.
The plaintiffs in their complaint and Brief of
Appellants have tried to counter the plain language of the
release by alleging that defendants misrepresented Chad's
- 91 -

condition, which caused them to settle the claim.

There is no

dispute, however, that plaintiffs knew Chad suffered brain
damage as the result of the incident on March 4, 1983. To
assist them in getting an independent medical evaluation,
plaintiffs were invited by Scott Olsen to send Chad to
specialists for tests and then wait to determine the extent of
Chad's injury before settlement was entered into.

The

plaintiffs declined the offer and chose to go forward with the
settlement.
On July 22, 1983, the Third Judicial District Court
inquired whether Roger and Polly Atkinson were aware that future
changes in Chad's condition were not actionable:
THE COURT:

What's the nature of the
child's of the child's injury?

MRS. ATKINSON: Brain damage.
THE COURT:

Do you understand that by
settling this case, and
regardless of what later
transpires, when you find out
later that the child's injuries
are worse than you anticipated,
and on the other hand, even if
it's better, that you will not
ever be able to come back
against Intermountain Health
Care? Do you understand that?

MRS. ATKINSON: Yes, Sir, I do.
Transcript at pp. 1-2.
Simply because plaintiffs now believe Chad has
actually suffered brain damage to a greater extent than earlier
_ oo _

believed is no reason to reopen the settlement agreement.

The

release should prohibit the present action.

Bo

Plaintiffs cannot both affirm and disaffirm.

The plaintiffs' approach in affirming the contractual
benefits while disaffirming the contractual release of all
claims against IHC, which is the essential purpose of the
agreement, is not permissible.

Under the circumstances, the

Atkinsons have to either affirm the contract in its entirety and
be bound by the release in the settlement agreement or disaffirm
the contract and sue on the original claim.

If they affirm the

contract, which they appear to have done by continually
demanding the monthly benefits and payment of medical expenses,
while keeping all sums disbursed to them, they have to accept
the terms of the contract, the most important of which is a
prohibition against this suit.
The victim of alleged fraud cannot both affirm and
disaffirm.

See 37 Am.Jur. 2d, Fraud and Deceit § 328, note 1;

and Restatement, Contracts §§ 484, 485.

To claim the benefits

of part of the settlement agreement, which includes receipt of
monthly payments and medical expenses, while not abiding by the
agreement not to sue, which is plaintiffs' obligation under the
agreement, defeats the essential purpose of the compromise and
settlement.
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Plaintiffs are not permitted to seek a remedy based on
affirmance which is inconsistent with the remedy based on
disaffirmance.

The theories are not consistent.

As noted by

one court:

Having affirmed the settlement contract,
[plaintiffs] may not also avoid the burdens of
that contract, including [their] promise not
to sue [the defendant]. A remedy based on
affirmance of the contract is inconsistent
with the remedy, arising out of the same
facts, based on disaffirmance, and
rescission. Holscher v. Ferry, 131 Colo. 190,
280 P.2d 655 (1955). When [plaintiffs]
elected to affirm the contract, [they]
abandoned [their] right to rescind it in whole
or in part. Id. Hence the covenant not to
sue remains enforceable.
Trimball v. City and County of Denver, 697 P.2d 716, 723 (Colo.
1985) (emphasis added).

In fact, the reverse may now be true.

"Where one party repudiates the contract or prevents performance
thereof, the other party may rescind and recover what he has
paid and the value of any performance on his part."
Restatement, Contracts § 347.

Thus, plaintiffs should not be

able to maintain an action for fraud while affirming an
agreement with the release in place.

As noted in 58 A.L.R. 2d

at 508, an action cannot be maintained to recover damages for
fraud practiced upon the plaintiff in inducing him to execute a
release to the defendant for personal injuries, since the fraud
complaint renders the release invalid, and the original cause of
action remains to the plaintiff.

If the release is invalid (which must be the result if
it was obtained by fraud) the injured plaintiffs have the remedy
of suing on the original cause of action, and hence have
suffered no damage from the alleged fraud or misrepresentation.,
Counts I and II of the complaint must therefore be barred by the
release in the settlement agreement.
cases

None of plaintiffs1 cited

invalidate a court-approved release.
Plaintiffs claim the agreement in this present action

was based on an inaccurate assessment of Chad's physical
condition, and that because the defendants misrepresented the
true state of his situation, the settlement agreement should
essentially be modified, with the payout increased from
approximately $1,280,000.00 to three million dollars.

As noted

above in the first argument, however, plaintiffs have no
evidence in the record which shows IHC or the treating
physicians misstated Chad's condition.
In support of their proposition, plaintiffs cite five
cases supposedly standing for the principle that fraud can set
aside a written release.

None of the cases, however, grant a

court authority to invalidate a written release that has been
approved by a prior court and where significant consideration
has and will be paid.

A review of plaintiffs1 cases (see Brief

of Appellants at pp. 39-40) show that none are addressed to the
facts of this case.

See Kelly v. Salt Lake Transportation Co. #

116 P.2d 383 (Utah 1941)

(insurance adjuster settled personal
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injury claim for $20.00 and payment of medical bills in exchange
for a written release; the court held the alleged inadequate
consideration was not so grossly inadequate as to indicate
fraud; plaintiff had opportunity to consult with others before
making a decision to accept; the court reversed a jury verdict
and directed judgment for the defendants); Automobile
Underwriters v. Rich, 53 N.E. 2d 775 (Ind. 1944).

(Release was

signed in exchange for $150.00 by plaintiff who was in the care
of a physician for a permanently injured knee-cap; the
defendant's claims agent falsely told plaintiff he had
investigated her injuries and the injuries were not permanent
but merely temporary, and that she could go to work in a few
days); Inman v. Merchants Mutual Casualty Co., 83 N.Y.S. 2d 801,
274 App. Div. 320 (1948)

(the court set aside a release where a

wrongful death action was exchanged for $400.00 by the mother of
a deceased son; defendant's agent had misrepresented that her
son had caused the accident, that if she sued she would not get
anything and would have to pay legal fees, and that the
settlement would be satisfactory to the mother's attorney);
Estes v. Magee, 109 P.2d 631 (Ida. 1940) (release induced by
physician-defendant was set aside; physician had paid plaintiff
$200.00 and misrepresented the degree of patient's injuries,
asserting that the injuries were not serious and that the
patient would entirely recover in a short time); and Southern
Ry. Co. v. James, 140 N.E. 556 (Ind. 1923)
- 26 -

(release was set

aside which was procured by payment of $500.00 in
misrepresentations of defendant's agents that they had
supposedly consulted plaintiff's physician, who had allegedly
informed them that his injuries were temporary and that he would
be fully and completely recovered in one year, and that he would
receive "a life-time job" which never materialized).
IHC does not dispute that fraud can set aside a
written release.

However, plaintiffs, not only show no evidence

of misrepresentations by IHC, whether negligent or knowing, but
cite no authority for invalidating a written release where the
prior court approving the settlement and release specifically
questioned competent plaintiffs about the very issues now being
raised as a basis for deception, and where the performance under
the settlement agreement has been and will be substantial.

III.

PLAINTIFFS' ACTION IS BARRED BY APPLICABLE
STATUTES OF LIMITATION.

Chad Atkinson's injury occurred on March 4, 1983.
Throughout the summer of 1983, beginning no later than May 27,
the Atkinsons were informed by doctors, an administrator at
Primary Children's Medical Center, and Scott Olsen that Chad was
brain damaged, that the hospital felt responsible for Chad's
injuries, and that the Atkinsons had a valid claim against the
hospital.

This was confirmed by the district judge before

approving the settlement agreement on July 22, 1983.
- 27 -

At that

time, they were informed by the Court that the value of the
settlement agreement was approximately $900,000.00, rather than
the alleged three million dollars.

The district court was

informed by the Atkinsons at that time that Chad had suffered
brain damage.

Such facts should be sufficient to start the

statutes of limitations running for either medical malpractice,
fraud or mistake.
A.

The Health Care Malpractice Act bars this action.

Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act's provisions requiring, among other things,
the timely filing of a notice of intent before an action is
commenced against a health care provider.

The Act is not

limited to "pure" actions of medical malpractice.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(29) explains which actions
come within the Health Care Malpractice Act:
Any action against a health care provider
whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty,
wrongful death or otherwise, based upon
alleged personal injuries relating to or
arising out of health care rendered or which
should have been rendered by the health care
provider.
This is certainly an action against a health care
provider in "contract, tort, . . . .

or otherwise, based upon

alleged personal injuries relating to health care rendered or
which should have been rendered by the health care provider."
Id.

If there is any doubt, one only needs to consider the

nature of the plaintiffs1 claims and the evidence that will be
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asserted to show damages.

Though plaintiffs claim this is a

fraud action, plaintiffs will eventually need to prove medical
malpractice to the same extent as if they had sued on the
original cause of action.
This case falls neatly into the problem long
recognized and explained in 58 A.L.R. 2d at 501, note 1.

Where

the original cause of action is one for unliquidated damages, as
in the ordinary personal injury situation, plaintiffs face the
difficulty of establishing the extent of the injury attributable
to the fraud or duress that induced the execution of the release
or compromise agreement.

Trying such an action becomes awkward,

since the fact-finder in the fraud action has to consider the
evidence as to the original tort and estimate the amount the
plaintiffs would have recovered if they had brought suit and
forced their claim on the original claim for personal injury.
Thus, a fact-finder trying an issue of negligence
allegedly resulting in personal injury in an action brought
exclusively to recover for such injury is one thing; but a
fact-finder trying an issue of negligence in an action for fraud
and deceit, to determine how much the plaintiffs would have
recovered if they had litigated their negligence claim, is
something else again.
It is clear the issues and evidence in plaintiffs'
fraud claim parallel the issues and evidence in the original
medical malpractice claim.

The proof on damages will involve
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the identical proof needed to show liability and extent of
injury as would have to be shown in the medical malpractice
suit.

Thus, defendant IHC believes the Health Care Malpractice

Act squarely applies, since this is an action in contract, tort
or otherwise which relates to health care which should have been
rendered by the health care provider.
The Atkinsons tried to avoid the statute of
limitations by claiming that instead of suing for medical
malpractice, they are suing because the defendants fraudulently
concealed information from them.

Though the Atkinsons have

shown no evidence in the record that IHC misrepresented any
facts, even if they did, the one-year statute of limitations for
fraudulent concealment contained in § 78-14-4(1)(b) would bar
their action.
Since plaintiffs have failed to comply with the
provisions of the Health Care Malpractice Act in timely bringing
their suit, IHC believes the Atkinsons' complaint was
appropriately dismissed by the district judge for failure to
meet the statutory prerequisite of timely filing a notice of
intent to commence an action as required by Utah Code Ann. §
78-14-8, and the applicable two-year statute of limitations
under § 78-14-4(1).

B.

Applicability of the statute of limitations to a
minor is constitutional.
- ^n -

The Atkinsons argue that if the medical malpractice
statute of limitations bars Chad Atkinsons1 claim, that this
would violate his Utah constitutional rights to equal protection
and access to courts.

In the interest of brevity, and to avoid

duplication, IHC adopts the response of Wetzel and Olsen as set
forth in their Brief of Respondents.

The long line of precedent

therein cited, and the reasons therefor, should confirm that the
Utah legislature necessarily and appropriately capped the time
in which a minor can bring a claim.
In addition to the argument supporting the
constitutionality of the medical malpractice statute of
limitation and the statute of repose, IHC wishes to point out
that the Health Care Malpractice Act is not irrational merely
because a parent as natural guardian, or someone else as
guardian ad litem, may need to pursue the child's cause of
action on the child's behalf.
In most instances parents have the primary
responsibility to protect, educate and care for their children.
For example, some specific duties now placed on the parent for
the child's protection are set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6
(parent or guardian may sue for death or injury of minor caused
by wrongful act or neglect of another); § 78-45-3, (every man
shall support his child); § 78-45-9 (an obligee or state
department of social services may enforce a child's right of
support against parent); § 76-7-201 (failure to provide medical
- 31 -

care is criminal neglect).

See also 12 A.L.R. 2d 1047.

Compare

Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 P.2d 895 (Utah 1976) (children have a
right to support); Ottley v. Hill, 21 Utah 2d 396, 446 P.2d 301
(1968) (a parent is under a legal duty to pay medical care);
Gulley v. Gulley, 570 P. 2d 127 (Utah 1977) (a parent cannot rid
himself of his duty to support his children by contract); Gawand
v. Gawand, 615 P.2d 422 (Utah 1980) (parent has duties to
support a retarded child).

See also 34 A.L.R. 2d 1460 (right of

child against parent for its support).
Parents are natural guardians of minor children and as
such have vested rights and duties to act in the children's
behalf.

See 39 Am.Jur 2d, Guardian and Ward, § 5, setting forth

the long established principle that a guardian has not only a
right, but a duty, to institute and prosecute litigation
necessary to maintain and preserve a ward's rights.

A guardian

may also be liable for a loss caused by the guardian's neglect
or for breach of duty.
from this duty.

Id.

at § 187.

Parents are not exempt

As natural guardians of the child, they are the

trustees of the child's rights which are vested in the parents
for the benefit of the child.

Id.

at § 8.

They have a duty to

protect and preserve the rights and welfare of the children,
at § 14, and are charged with the care and management of the
children's estates.

Id.

at § 48.
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id.

C.

Plaintiffs1 complaint for fraud or mistake is

barred by § 78-12-26(3).
In addition to being barred by the medical malpractice
statute of limitations, the Atkinsons' complaint is also barred
by the three-year statute of limitations covering claims of
fraud or mistake.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3).

Plaintiffs'

claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation would have to
have been brought within three years from the day the fraud or
mistake was discovered.
The Atkinsons seek damages for the defendants'
misrepresentation of Chad's condition.

The central theory of

plaintiffs' complaint is that the defendants allegedly
represented the "settlement was worth in excess of three million
dollars."

(Complaint, R. at 2-19, fl 18.)

Based on that alleged

representation of the value of Chad's damaged condition,
plaintiffs assert the present value of the actual settlement is
$109,000.00.

They then claim damages of $2,891,000.00, which

represents the difference between the "represented" value and
the alleged actual value of the settlement.

According to

plaintiffs' complaint, had the settlement agreement been for
three million dollars as represented, there would be no need for
this action.

Note that the Atkinsons ignore the fact in their

brief that regardless of Chad's condition, IHC has paid and will
pay Chad's medical expenses, which could exceed three million
dollars if he suffers a significant reverse.
- n -

In addition to

this amount, Chad would also receive a payment of approximately
$900,000.00 to cover general damages.

Further, note that

nowhere in the record is there evidence that IHC represented the
value of the settlement agreement would be three million dollars.
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3) an "action for
relief on the ground of fraud or mistake" must be brought within
three years from the date the fraud or mistake is discovered.
The statute would cover Counts I and II of the complaint for
fraud and negligent misrepresentation.

See, e.g., Larsen v.

Utah Loan and Trust Co., 23 Utah 449, 65 P. 208 (1901) (this
section applies to the fraud of a bank even though the fraud is
not intentional); Gibson v. Jensen, 48 Utah 244, 158 P.426
(1916) (one informed of such facts as will put a person of
ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry has received such
information as will start the running of limitations).
Assuming plaintiffs1 allegation that the settlement
agreement was to represent a value of three million dollars,
even though there is no evidence in the record IHC represented
such, when did the Atkinsons learn the settlement agreement
would not pay that amount?

An undisputed water mark is July 22,

1983, when the district court interviewed plaintiffs Roger and
Polly Atkinson:
THE COURT:

Well, what's your
understanding of the offer?

MRS. ATKINSON:

That he would be taken care
of both medical, financial,
his education.

THE COURT:

Do you understand that this
provides for monthly payments?

MRS. ATKINSON:

Yes, I do.

THE COURT:

Do you understand that it
will be -- you will get
$500.00 per month or $6,000 a
year?

MRS. ATKINSON:

Yes, sir, I do.

THE COURT:

What about a bond, Mr. Morgan?

MR. MORGAN:

They are seeking approval
without bond.

THE COURT:

I think in light of the fact
that we are going to have a
-- if the child gets to be 65
years of age the total payout
will be $900,000.00.

MR. MORGAN:

Correct.
* * * *

THE COURT:

And your name, sir?

MR. ATKINSON:

Roger W. Atkinson.

THE COURT:

Are you the father of the
child?

MR. ATKINSON:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Do you believe that you, on
behalf of the child, have a
claim against Intermountain
Health Care?

MR. ATKINSON:

Yes, I do.

THE COURT:

It's my understanding that
there's a structured
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settlement of a total payout
of $900,000.00?
MR. ATKINSON:

Yes, sir*

THE COURT:

Do you feel that this is
adequate?

MR. ATKINSON:

Yah, I do, considering the
hospitalization and
everything like that will be
covered.

THE COURT:

Do you feel this is in the
best interest of the child?

MR. ATKINSON:

I do.

THE COURT:

All right. I will approve
the settlement.

Transcript at pp. 2-4.
Counting three years from July 22, 1983, the date of
the court hearing, would require plaintiffs to file their
complaint by July 23, 1986.

The complaint, however, was not

filed until July 26, 1987, a full year beyond the expired
statute of limitations for fraud or mistake.
IV.

THE PROBATE COURT-APPROVED SETTLEMENT

COLLATERALLY ESTOPS PLAINTIFFS' ACTION.
Roger, Polly and Chad Atkinson, as well as IHC, were
before the Third Judicial District Court in July 1983 to
determine whether the financial payouts in the settlement
agreement were sufficient to cover Chad's brain damaged
condition.

By filing the complaint in this action, the same

parties were before the same court in an attempt to make the

ic

same determination.

Plaintiffs are again seeking payment to

cover Chad's condition.

Because the parties and issues are

related, the principle of collateral estoppel should apply to
bar this action.
Collateral estoppel prevents parties or their privies
from relitigating facts and issues in the second suit that were
fully resolved in the first suit.
P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 1978).

Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588

That the first action was to approve

a settlement agreement, and the second seeks damages in addition
to those provided by the earlier agreement, matters little to
collateral estoppel.

It is the related issue that is examined.

A four-fold test is used to determine if the second action is
sufficiently related to bar it:
1. Was the issue decided in the prior
adjudication identical with the one presented
in the action in question?
2.

Was there a final judgment on the merits?

3. Was the party against whom the plea is
asserted party or in privity with a party to
the prior adjudication?
4. Was the issue in the first case
competently, fully and fairly litigated?
Id.

at 691.
In applying this test, it can plainly be seen that the

issue in both the 1983 court approval and the present action
satisfies the first element of collateral estoppel.

The issue

was then and is now, whether certain damages are adequate to
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cover Chad's condition.

Whether the issue is "decided" in the

prior adjudication depends on whether it was "essential to
resolution" of the first suit.
P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983).

See Robertson v. Campbell, 674

Clearly, an understanding of Chad's

condition and the knowledge of the total financial payout was
essential to the Court's evaluation and appraisal of the
appropriateness of the settlement agreement.

The Court relied

on the admissions of both Roger and Polly Atkinson that they
were aware of the child's condition, that they had evaluated the
appropriateness of the settlement agreement, and that they
thought it was in the best interest of Chad Atkinson for the
Court to approve the same.
Looking to the second element of collateral estoppel,
there was a final judgment.

The Court specifically ordered that

the conservators, Roger and Polly Atkinson, were authorized to
accept the settlement offer as was set forth in the petition.
The Court further ordered that all claims of Chad Atkinson
against Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. could be
released.

See Order Approving Settlement of Minor's Claim and

To Execute Specific Release and Assignment, Exhibit 10 to
Deposition of Roger Atkinson, R. at 644.
As to the third and fourth elements, the parties are
identical and the issue of appropriate damages for Chad's
condition was competently, fully and fairly resolved.

The

Atkinsons admitted they knew that Chad was brain damaged, heard
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the court recite the payout was approximately $900,000.00, and
admitted to the court that they believed the settlement was in
the best interest of Chad Atkinson.

The fourth element is

satisfied if the parties "receive notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances to apprise them of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections."
1987).

Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 249 (Utah App.

Not only were the plaintiffs actually present in the

court room, but the court after due investigation found the
settlement agreement was fair in all respects.
644, Exhibit 10, p.l

See Order, R. at

("said settlement in all respects is

fair").
V.

PLAINTIFFS1 DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION LACKED A
JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY.

Through their complaint, the Atkinsons also sought a
declaratory judgment construing the settlement agreement to
require IHC to pay for institutional and custodial living
costs.
On September 3, 1987, IHC filed a motion to dismiss
Count IV of the complaint.

By agreement of counsel, the motion

was not noticed for hearing until after discovery pertinent to
the issues had been completed.

Since the discovery showed no

dispute as to any material fact, IHC then moved for summary
judgment.
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In IHC's initial memorandum, it was pointed out to the
district court that plaintiffs had no justiciable controversy.
In Count IV of the complaint the Atkinsons asked the court to
declare IHC responsible to pay certain anticipated institutional
and custodial care costs.

To date, defendant IHC has paid Chad

Atkinson's medical costs pursuant to the settlement agreement as
requested.

There is no allegation or facts in the record

indicating that plaintiffs have ever requested IHC to pay for
any items referred to in Count IV or that IHC has refused to pay
them.

(See Deposition of Polly Atkinson, R. at 648, p.113.)

Since no breach or anticipated breach was pled or shown in the
record, plaintiffs' claim under Count IV was not ripe and
therefore subject to dismissal by the district court.
Plaintiffs attempted to salvage Count IV by asserting
that even though there has been no breach or anticipated breach
of the settlement agreement the plaintiffs and IHC entered into,
that the Declaratory Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1, et
seqD, still permits them to ask the court for an advisory
opinion.
Plaintiffs' assertion that no actual controversy is
necessary is contrary to Utah law.

A complaint seeking a

declaratory judgment is still required to plead the existence of
a justiciable controversy.

See, e.g., Merhish v. H.A. Folsom <£

Assoc., 646 P.2d 731 (Utah 1982)

(notwithstanding its broad

terms, declaratory judgment legislation is still subject to
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requirements of justiciability); Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713
(Utah 1978)

("Courts have no jurisdiction to render a

declaratory judgment in the absence of a justiciable or actual
controversy"; the court's immediate duty is to dismiss the
defective cause of action); Backman v. Salt Lake County, 13 Utah
2d 412, 375 P.2d 756 (1962) (the Declaratory Judgment Act is not
designed for giving advisory opinions in a non-advisory action,
or to insure against feared risk).
IHC has continued to perform under the settlement
agreement; no claims have been denied to date that relate in any
way to Count IV.

Count IV should be dismissed for failure to

plead a justiciable controversy.

VI.

THE MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY
DENIED.

At the hearing on the motions for summary judgment of
IHC, Wetzel and Olsen, the district court denied the plaintiffs1
motion to amend their complaint because "the Motions for Summary
Judgment dispose of that."

(R. at 655, p.45.)

Insofar as the

motion to amend pertained to IHC, three reasons support the
denial.
Count II of the Second Proposed Amended Complaint (R.
at 569-588) would have added a claim for medical malpractice
against IHC.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1).

The claim was

untimely under either the one or two year statutes of
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limitation, or the four year statute of repose of the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act.
The two-year statute of limitations set forth at
§ 78-14-4(1) requires the commencement of an action within two
years from the time a "plaintiff or patient discovers, or
through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered
the injury, whichever first occurs."

When did plaintiffs

discover they had a claim against IHC?

Certainly, as early as

May 27, 1983 when the Atkinsons met with Primary Children's
administrator and Scott Olsen and were informed Primary
Children's Medical Center felt responsible for what had happened
to Chad,

(R. at 644, pp. 38-39, R. at 647, p. 44,)

Throughout

the summer of 1983, the Atkinsons were informed by doctors and
Scott Olsen that Chad had suffered oxygen deprivation after an
alarm on the machine attending him was not heard, as the alarm
may have been turned down.

Clearly, they had discovered by July

22, 1983 that they had a claim against IHC when the District
Court asked Polly Atkinson:
THE COURT:

Do you believe you have a
claim against Intermountain
Health Care?

MRS. ATKINSON:

Yes, I do.

(Transcript, p.1.)
Plaintiffs, however, assert in the Second Proposed
Amended Complaint that they did not discover the medical
malpractice "because of fraudulent concealment."

R. at 569-588,
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As noted above, there is no evidence in the record that

IHC negligently or fraudulently represented Chad Atkinson's
condition.

Even assuming there was discovery of a difference

between IHC's representations and Chad's condition, it would
have been discovered shortly after the settlement agreement was
reached.

R. at 647, pp. 142-143; R. at 645, pp. 28-29 (at age 6

months Chad was already showing a delay of 1-1% months in his
development).

Thus, the one-year statute of limitation for

fraudulent concealment long since ran by the time the Atkinsons
filed their notice of intent to commence an action on January 8,
1988.

Even plaintiffs admit in their appellate brief that they

discovered the alleged misrepresentations by March 3, 1986.

See

Brief of Appellants at p.60.
Finally, even if plaintiffs discovered the alleged
fraudulent concealment later than March 3, 1986, the four year
statute of repose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act would
bar the Atkinsons1 medical malpractice claim in the Second
Proposed Amended Complaint.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1).

This

Court has held that the statute of repose will apply regardless
of when discovery occurred.
(Utah 1987).

Sorensen v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336

Additionally, it is not necessary that a plaintiff

know the full nature, extent, severity or permanency of an
injury to have knowledge of "legal injury" necessary to commence
the running of the statute of limitations.

Duerden v. Utah

Valley Hospital, 663 F.Supp. 781, affirmed per curiam 876 F.2d
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108 (10th Cir. 1989).

Thus, the district court appropriately

denied the Atkinsons' motion to amend their complaint.
CONCLUSION
IHC believes justice will be served if this Court
recognizes the validity of the 1983 court approval of the
settlement and release and affirms the dismissal of the
complaint as to defendant IHC.

Additionally, IHC believes the

district court's granting of IHC's summary judgment was proper,
since the complaint was barred not only by the medical
malpractice statutes of limitations, but the statute of
limitations for fraud or mistake, and the principles of
collateral estoppel.

Under those theories the motion to amend

the complaint was also properly denied.

And since the Atkinsons

lacked a justiciable controversy under Count IV of their
complaint, the district court lacked jurisdiction to resolve
their declaratory judgment action.

Defendant-Respondent IHC

Hospitals, Inc. respectfully re< [uests that the granting of
summary judgment by the distric ; court be affirmed.
Dated this 9th day of August, 1989.
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